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Abstract 
In future, the organizations’ likelihood to endure and succeed will depend greatly on the quality 
of every decision made. It is known that most decisions in organizations are made in group. 
With the purpose of supporting decision-makers anytime and anywhere, Web-based Group 
Decision Support Systems (GDSS) have been studied. The amount of Web-based GDSS 
incorporating automatic negotiation mechanisms such as argumentation has been steadily 
increasing. Usually, these systems/models are evaluated through mathematical proofs, number 
of rounds or seconds to propose (reach) a solution. However, those techniques are not very 
informative in terms of the decision quality. Here, we propose a model that intends to predict 
the decision-makers’ satisfaction (perception of the decision quality), specifically designed to 
deal with multi-criteria problems. Our model considers aspects such as: meeting’s outcomes, 
decision-maker’s intentions, expectations and emotional cost. To validate the proposed model in 
terms of its ability to predict decision-makers’ satisfaction, we developed a prototype of a Web-
based GDSS to be used in a case study where the participant had to make a joint decision. The 
decision process consisted in a set of 5 rounds, where the participant could (re)configure his/her 
preferences along the process. The satisfaction model ascertained its ability to predict the 
participants’ satisfaction and allowed to understand that (as is stated in the literature) the 
inclusion of cognitive and emotional variables is essential to evaluate satisfaction more 
accurately. 
Keywords 
Group Decision Support Systems, Decision Satisfaction, Decision Quality, Outcomes, Affective 
Computing 
1. Introduction 
It is known that most decisions in organizations are made in group (Lunenburg, 2011). Group 
Decision Support Systems (GDSS) have been widely studied throughout the last decades to 
support this type of decisions (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1984; Desanctis & Gallupe, 1987). 
However, in the last ten/twenty years, we have seen a remarkable change in the context where 
the decision-making process happens, especially in large organizations (Grudin, 2002). With the 
emergence of global markets, the growth of multinational organizations and a global vision of 
the planet, we easily find decision-makers (chief executive officers, managers and other 
members of global virtual teams) spread around the world, in countries with different time 
zones (Shum, Cannavacciuolo, De Liddo, Iandoli, & Quinto, 2013). However, to support the 
group decision-making process in this context is particularly complex, due to the fact that 
decision-makers are geographically dispersed. To provide an answer and operate correctly in 
this type of scenarios, the traditional GDSS have evolved to what we identify today as Web-
based GDSS (Alonso, Herrera-Viedma, Chiclana, & Herrera, 2010; Kwon, Yoo, & Suh, 2005). 
The idea behind the Web-based GDSS is to support the decision-making process “anytime” and 
“anywhere” (Grudin, 2002). The automatic negotiation mechanisms can be used (in Web-based 
GDSS) to help overcome the lack of interaction inherent to the context described before 
(Rahwan et al., 2003). Usually, these systems/models are evaluated through mathematical 
proofs, number of rounds or seconds to propose (reach) a solution (Marreiros, Santos, Ramos, & 
Neves, 2010). However, those techniques do not say much in terms of decision quality. In fact, 
the decision quality is impossible to measure in the end of a group decision-making process. 
What is possible to measure, or what can be valuable to know in the end of a group decision-
making process is the perception of the decision quality of each of the decision-makers (or their 
satisfaction) (Carneiro, Marreiros, & Novais, 2015). Satisfaction is therefore a strong indicator, 
not only of the results, but also of the whole decision process (Higgins, 2000). When someone is 
questioned about the quality of a decision, the answer does not reflect only the assessment of 
outcomes, but also, albeit unconsciously, includes the evaluation process necessary to reach the 
decision (Higgins, 2000). Satisfaction as a metric has been applied in the literature to many 
different issues: life satisfaction (Schimmack, Oishi, Furr, & Funder, 2004), job satisfaction 
(Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002), etc. Satisfaction has also been applied in the GDSS topic. 
However, the existing proposals are not concerned with the perception of the decision quality 
but instead with decision-maker’s satisfaction regarding the GDSS performance, usability, 
among others (Briggs, de Vreede, & Reinig, 2003; Paul, Seetharaman, & Ramamurthy, 2004; 
Tian, Hou, & Yuan, 2008). 
The ability to predict the quality of the decision through the perception of quality by each 
decision-maker may bring countless new possibilities, such as: to evaluate different systems and 
models (and to compare their ability to potentiate satisfaction); to use it in new algorithms to 
predict the decision-maker’s satisfaction, and also as a metric to potentiate satisfaction, as a 
variable that we can try to maximize. Besides, it also allows that organizations may use this 
metric as an important indicator of the degree of trust associated with a particular decision. 
In this work, we study satisfaction as a metric to understand the decision-maker’s perception of 
the decision quality. Our proposal is defined based in the assumptions and premises previously 
published in Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015), which contemplate different approaches from 
researchers of a wide range of areas in this thematic (computer sciences, psychology, economy, 
etc.). It intends to allow automatic assessment of the participants’ satisfaction in a meeting 
supported by a Web-based GDSS. To evaluate decision-maker’s satisfaction, we consider the 
alternatives comparison, style of behavior, emotions, mood and expectations. Our research 
hypotheses are: (h1) it is possible to formulate a decision satisfaction model that correctly 
(mathematically) expresses the assumptions and premises identified in Carneiro, Marreiros, et 
al. (2015); and (h2) it is possible to predict the decision-makers’ perception of the decision 
quality with a high degree of accuracy. In order to study h1, we performed a large set of 
simulations in a prototype (previously developed) that uses a negotiation architecture based on 
social networks (Carneiro, Martinho, Marreiros, & Novais, 2016) and implements the 
argumentation-based dialogue model proposed in Carneiro, Martinho, Marreiros, Jimenez, and 
Novais (2017). All the simulations performed consisted of inserting a set of previously defined 
inputs in order to see if the obtained satisfaction varied according to what was expected. To 
study h2, we carried out a case study with 43 participants which consisted in a group decision-
making process using a Web-based GDSS. To do so, we developed a prototype of a Web-based 
GDSS to support participants in reaching a decision. The proposed satisfaction model asserted 
its ability to predict the participants’ satisfaction with a high degree of accuracy, showing that in 
some scenarios it can even evaluate the perception of the decision quality by some participants 
in a more correct/precise level than themselves. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following order: in the next Section, we present the 
literature review. In Section 3, we introduce the proposed satisfaction model. In Section 4 we 
present our Study 1, where we verify if the proposed satisfaction model respects the 
assumptions and premises published in Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015). Section 5 consists in 
our Study 2, where it will be presented a case study with real participants, in order to test if the 
model is able to predict the satisfaction of decision-makers (participants) with a high degree of 
accuracy. In Section 6 the discussion is presented. Finally, some conclusions are put forward in 
Section 7, alongside with suggestions of work to be done hereafter. 
2. Literature Review 
There is a moment, between the time when a decision is made and the time when that decision 
is put into practice, during which it is not possible to measure the quality of the decision, since 
we do not know what the practical consequences of such decision will be. A football player who 
decides to score a penalty to the right, a company that decides to open a new branch in New 
York, a worker who decides to return home from work using the highway in order to arrive as 
fast as possible or a group of friends who choose a restaurant to celebrate a special occasion, are 
examples of decisions that allow us to easily understand that it is only possible to perceive the 
quality of the decision that was made after the penalty is beaten, the branch open, the worker 
gets home and the group of friends are served dinner. However, this does not mean that the 
quality of a decision has completely random assumptions, quite the opposite is true. It is known 
that factors such as the level of expertise of decision-makers (Klein, 1997), intellectual and 
emotional abilities (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) also have a great influence on the 
quality of decisions. It is the ability to anticipate situations and predict what will happen that 
allows humans to make better decisions and improve their decision-making abilities (Agor, 
1986). As such, the period immediately after the decision-making process provides an important 
indicator of what the consequences of the decision may be: satisfaction with the decision or the 
perception of the decision quality from the decision-maker’s point of view. However, in order to 
be able to measure this satisfaction/perception first of all, we need to know what factors 
influence the perception of the quality of the decision. Literature is not very rich in this domain. 
However, Higgins (2000) presents very interesting work on what is considered to be a good 
decision. 
Higgins (2000) says that “a good decision has high outcome benefits (it is worthwhile) and low 
outcome costs (it is worth it)”, and that “independent of outcomes or value from worth, people 
experience a regulatory fit when they use goal pursuit means that fit their regulatory orientation, 
and this regulatory fit increases the value of what they are doing”. Decision satisfaction is 
therefore a strong indicator, not only of the results, but also of the whole decision process. 
When someone is questioned about the quality of a decision, the answer does not reflect only 
the assessment of outcomes, but also, even unconsciously, the evaluation process necessary to 
reach the decision. To understand how suitable a decision is, it is necessary to understand and 
analyze the means by which that decision is reached (Beach, 1990; March, 1994). Thus, one 
should give prominence to the process when drawing conclusions about the results. Satisfaction 
with a decision resulting from a decision process needs a complex analysis and involves 
multiple variables. Obviously, satisfaction is related to what we think a good decision is. But 
what is a good decision? As previously referred, according to common sense, a decision is 
considered good because of the analogy made with the obtained results. However, 
psychologically, the results are not enough to make a participant consider a decision as good. 
Higgins (2000) says that “psychologically, then, a decision is perceived as good when its 
expected value or utility of outcomes is judged to be more beneficial than the alternatives. The 
benefits include the social benefits of a decision, such as those received from a ‘politically 
correct’ or ingratiating decision. The costs of attaining the outcomes can also influence whether 
a decision is perceived as good. The outcome benefits have to be weighed against the costs of 
attaining the outcomes. The costs include not only the goods or services one must give in 
exchange for receiving the benefits but also the costs of the decision-making process itself. The 
decision-making process that would optimize outcomes might not be used because the costs in 
cognitive effort or time are too high”. Therefore, it is clear that there is much more than 
knowing if the chosen alternative is the participant’s favorite in order to evaluate his satisfaction 
with the decision. It has been suggested that a purely cognitive approach may be inadequate in 
the modeling of satisfaction ratings, so it is particularly important to include emotional variables 
(Liljander & Strandvik, 1997; Oliver, Rust, & Varki, 1997; Wirtz & Bateson, 1999). The 
research made in the field of satisfaction has recognized that there is a need to incorporate the 
emotional and affective components in regulating the consumer’s satisfaction (Wirtz, Mattila, & 
Tan, 2000). Therefore, the final results and the decisions made are not the only responsible for 
determining the quality and the satisfaction of the decision. In his work, Higgins (2000) says: 
“We are all familiar with the idea expressed in the maxim of the late-19th-century British 
statesman John Morley, ‘It is not enough to do good; one must do it the right way’ or the 
coaching classic, ‘What counts is not whether you win or lose but how you play the game’. 
Such maxims reflect a moral position: Achievements should be evaluated not only in terms of 
outcomes but also in terms of the means by which they were attained. ‘The ends do not justify 
the means.’”. Using the reasoning present in this approach and the moral objective of these 
famous maxims, the process relevance in performing a certain action is easily understood. We 
can also conclude that the impact of the decision-making process can drastically change the 
participant’s satisfaction regardless of the results. Higgins (2000) also refers that “this insight 
concerns how the goodness of a decision depends not only on its relation to ends or outcomes 
but also on whether the means used to make it were suitable. Suitability here refers only to what 
is morally proper. By considering proper the more general meaning of suitable as ‘fit’, a new 
perspective on what makes good decisions good is possible”. The consideration of several 
factors is therefore necessary to obtain a correct approach in the decision-maker’s satisfaction 
analysis regarding the decision made. 
In this Section we review a set of topics that influence the way by which the quality of the 
decision is perceived. This literature review reflects the existing knowledge in each of the 
topics, as well as, if they exist, of models that allow to manipulate and implement this type of 
knowledge. 
2.1. Expectation 
The expectation levels are the reason why two organizations in the same sector can offer such 
distinct levels of service while keeping consumers equally satisfied (Zeithaml, Berry, & 
Parasuraman, 1993). That is why McDonald’s can enlarge an industrialized service of 
excellence, with few employees per consumer, while an expensive restaurant with employees 
dressed in tuxedos may not do it so well from the costumer’s perspective (Davidow & Uttal, 
1989). A costumer’s expectations are pre-conceived beliefs about a particular product (Olson & 
Dover, 1979) that serve as benchmarks against which the product is evaluated. Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, and Berry (2002) state that the evaluation of the service quality made by the customer 
results from comparing the existing expectations with the actual performance. Anyway, despite 
the importance of expectations being recognized in several works as the service quality 
(Gronroos, 1983) and customer satisfaction (Oliver, 1985), many questions related to the role of 
expectations have been considered in research and need to be answered. Consumer expectations 
have been studied in several research environments (Oliver & Winer, 1987), with a greater 
emphasis in the analysis of the consumer’s satisfaction/dissatisfaction and service quality. In 
literature, there is a consensus on expectations to serve as standards against which subsequent 
experiences are compared, resulting in assessments of satisfaction and quality. Consensus on 
other issues such as: the expectation’s specific nature, the number of standards used, and the 
sources or antecedents of expectations, have not yet been met. Research under the topic of 
expectations is mostly related to the service quality, but the principles addressed are perfectly 
applicable in decision group processes. Naturally, decision-makers create expectations 
regarding the process (for instance, if it will be more or less litigious) and the possibility of 
reaching their objectives. Several expectations patterns have been proposed: expectations as 
standard predictions (Oliver, 1985), expectations as the ideal pattern (Miller, 1977), 
expectations of experience based on standards (Woodruff, Cadotte, & Jenkins, 1983), tolerable 
minimum expectations (Miller, 1977), among others (deserved expectations (Miller, 1977) and 
comparative expectations (Prakash, 1984)). 
2.2. Emotion 
Emotion, in a general definition, is a neural impulse that moves an organism towards action. 
Emotions are caused by the interaction of a human-being with the environment and the others, 
affecting the decisions and actions. There are several types of emotions, being the cognitive 
emotion the most important for this work. Cognitive emotion is related to knowledge, being 
actions such as: learning, memorizing, motivating and planning, considered cognitive processes. 
It is possible to learn to control a certain emotion through cognitive evaluation. An individual is 
under the effect of a certain emotion during a short period. It is well known and considered for a 
long time that emotions play a fundamental role in humans, and only recently psychologists 
began studying emotions as a component that positively affects intelligence and cognitive 
aspects (Ekman, 1992). A great set of evidences has demonstrated that emotions have impact on 
reasoning, memory and judging (Li, Qiu, Yue, & Zhong, 2007). Damasio (2006) showed that 
people with deficiencies at the level of the emotional response, generally adopt weak decisions, 
severely limiting their interpersonal relationships and their place in society. Gardner (1987) 
proposed the concept of “multiple intelligences”, considering personal intelligence as a specific 
kind of intelligence that deals with the interaction and emotions. Later, Goleman (1995) used 
the term “emotional intelligence”, recognizing the current point of view that emotion is really an 
important part of the human intelligence. Lately, the modelling of emotions has had a very 
strong growth with respect to their computational representation. The incorporation of emotions 
in games and applications enables a more natural interaction with the user. Nass, Moon, Fogg, 
Reeves, and Dryer (1995) showed in their work that humans like to communicate with 
computers in a similar way to that used to interact with other people. With respect to the 
application area of emotions, Kessler et al. (2008) identified three: 
• Artificial emotions: can be used to improve problem solving in complex environments; 
• Emotional models: can be used to perform experiments of psychological theories using 
controlled scenarios; 
• Emotions: are fundamental to make computer agents more credible. Emotional models 
that are able to synthetize and express emotions are needed to make artificial 
intelligence characters look more human. 
Many psychologists have proposed models to describe emotional processes. One of the most 
popular is the OCC model, developed by Ortony, Clore and Collins, deriving its name from 
their initials, a model that is widely used to analyze emotions (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1990). 
According to this model, an emotion is triggered as a reaction to: consequences of events, 
actions of agents, or aspects of objects. Thus, emotional perceptions appear related to the 
objectives, patterns and preferences of an individual. To calculate the intensity of an emotion, 
global variables are considered, such as the sense of reality and proximity, as well as local 
variables, such as the probability of an event to occur, the effort to achieve a goal and the 
possibility to fulfill an objective. The OCC model also evaluates the preferences and patterns of 
the agent. The emotions are generated by the interpretation of the agent to the reactions to the 
consequences of the events, actions of other agents and aspects of the objects. Agents can be 
people, animals, inanimate objects, or abstractions as institutions. Events are how agents 
perceive what happens. There are three kinds of value structures underlying the perception of 
goodness and badness: objectives, norms and attitudes. Patterns are used to assess the actions of 
an agent. The actions of an agent are evaluated according to his obedience to social norms, 
morals, or behaviors. Finally, the objects are evaluated as attractive, depending on the 
compatibility with taste and attitudes of their attributes. One of the many practical 
implementations of the OCC model was developed by Staller and Petta (1998), who constructed 
a virtual agent whose emotional architecture related categories of discrete emotions to 14 
categories of action-response, covering a wide range of individual actions. The OCC model is 
also partially congruent with the renowned theory of Frijda (1986). 
Another important emotional model was proposed by Roseman, Spindel, and Jose (1990). 
According to this model, emotions are generated based on an event association procedure. 
Events are divided into events with consistent motifs and events with inconsistent motifs. The 
former is defined as being consistent with the objectives of the individual, while the latter, the 
inconsistent, are events that threaten one of the objectives that the individual proposes to 
achieve. Events are further classified according to the cause of the event, and can be caused by 
third parties, by the own individual or by circumstance. Another way to differentiate emotions is 
that an event was motivated because the subject wanted a reward or wanted to avoid a 
punishment. A certainty measure was also used as another way to classify events: an event may 
be declared in an unexpected, certain, or uncertain manner, i.e., subject to a valuation. 
2.3. Mood 
Mood is a psychological state of an individual that indicates the degree of his mood and well-
being Mehrabian (1996), being a way of representing the emotions felt and the individual’s 
personality. A mood is maintained over a period of time until something, such as the emotions 
felt, give rise to a new mood. A person’s mood influences his/her decisions and is important in 
the way he/she analyzes the received information. There are several models developed to 
analyze an individual’s mood, being PAD (Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance), developed by 
Mehrabian (1995), one of the most popular. PAD is a model that allows the integration of 
personality and emotions in order to know the generated mood Mehrabian (1996). This model 
defines three dimensions which describe the emotional state (mood/temperament) of an 
individual: pleasant, arousable and dominant (Mehrabian & O’reilly, 1980). These three 
dimensions define a three-dimensional space where individuals are represented as points, 
personality types as regions and personality scales as straight lines that cross the intersection 
point of the three axes. By using +P, +A, and +D, Mehrabian (1995) refers to pleasure, 
arousable, and dominant temperament, respectively, and -P, -A, and –D, to unpleasant, 
unarousable, and submissive temperament. 
Another model also well cited is PANAS, developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) is a 
model often mentioned in literature capable of measuring mood, and is used in many research 
works. Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) are the scales used in this model. It is 
composed by two of ten items of psychometric scales that measure positive affect (the extent to 
which individual feels attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired, proud, 
determined, strong, and active) and negative affect (the extent to which individual feels 
anguished, angry, hostile, irritated, scared, afraid, ashamed, guilty, nervous, and easily 
perturbable). PANAS has been demonstrated to be very reliable and easy to apply (Watson et 
al., 1988), being an instrument frequently used in psychology and other areas (Crawford & 
Henry, 2004; Mackinnon et al., 1999). Numerical answers are given on a 5-point Likert scale 
for the ten items of Positive Affect and for the ten items of Negative Affect, which are added to 
obtain a single score for PA and NA, comprised between 10 and 50. 
2.4. Models to define conflict and behavior styles 
In this Subsection, we put forward some models that can be used by computer scientists to 
model anthropomorphic agents. A current problem in the humanization of agents is related to 
the lack of knowledge that still exists about human psychological functioning, and perhaps even 
more so regarding the formalization of such knowledge. This problem often leaves computer 
scientists prone to devise strategies that still lack solid scientific validation. In this regard, a 
greater investment in multidisciplinary teams becomes of uppermost importance. Next, we 
advance/put forward some models that, in our view, show the potential of the adaptation to 
computational systems, regardless of whether they are simulators or real systems. 
Kilmann and Thomas (1975) suggested a model for interpersonal conflict-handling behavior, 
based on Jung’s studies and a conflict handling mode proposed by Blake and Mouton (1964), 
that defines five modes: competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and 
accommodating, according to two dimensions: assertiveness and cooperativeness. As seen in 
Figure 1, both the dimensions of assertiveness and cooperativeness are related to the integrative 
and distributive dimensions as discussed by Walton and McKersie (1965). Integrative 
dimension refers to the overall satisfaction of the group involved in the discussion while the 
distributive dimension refers to the individual’s satisfaction within the group. It is possible to 
see that the thinking-feeling dimension maps onto the distributive dimension while the 
introversion-extraversion dimension maps onto the integrative dimension. This association 
becomes more evident if we conceive competitors as the ones who seek the highest individual 
satisfaction and collaborators as the ones who prefer the highest satisfaction of the entire group. 
On the other hand, avoiders, do not worry about group satisfaction and accommodators do not 
worry about individual satisfaction. They also concluded that the thinking-feeling dimension did 
not move towards the integrative dimension, and that the introversion-extraversion did not 
overlap with the distributive dimension. 
 
Figure 1. Thomas and Kilmann’s model for interpersonal conflict-handling behavior (adapted from Kilmann and 
Thomas (1975)). 
McCrae and John (1992) proposed a set of thirty traits extending the five-factor model of 
personality which included six facets for each of the factors. These traits were used in a study 
made by Howard and Howard (1995) in order to help them separate different kinds of behavior 
styles and identify corresponding themes. They defined a theme as “a trait which is attributable 
to the combined effect of two or more separate traits” (Howard & Howard, 1995). Those styles 
and themes are based on common sense and general research, and can be inferred as the conflict 
styles that were proposed, (Negotiator, Aggressor, Submissive and Avoider). It is also important 
to refer other suggested relevant styles, such as the Decision and Learning styles. Decision style 
includes the Autocratic, Bureaucratic, Diplomat and Consensus themes while Learning style 
includes the Classroom, Tutorial, Correspondence and Independent themes. 
Rahim (1983) created a meta-model of possible styles for handling interpersonal conflict based 
on two dimensions: concern for self and concern for the other. Later, Rahim and Magner (1995) 
performed a study to assess the construct validity of the five subscales of the Rahim 
Organizational Conflict Inventory (Rahim, 1983). The styles defined by Rahim (1983) are 
presented in Figure 2. He acknowledges the existence of 5 types of conflict styles: integrating, 
obliging, dominating, avoiding and compromising. In this work, he suggested these styles as 
means to describe different possible ways of behaving in conflicting situations. The proposed 
styles are defined according to the level of concern an individual demonstrates for achieving 
one’s own goal or following through on other people’s objectives. 
 
Figure 2. Rahim’s proposal of conflict styles (adapted from Rahim and Magner (1995)). 
The model proposed by Rahim (1983) also relates to the themes identified by Howard and 
Howard (1995) to a certain extent. The Aggressor theme resembles the Dominating style; the 
Negotiator theme resembles the Integrating style; the Avoiding theme resembles the Avoider 
style; and the Submissive theme resembles the Obliging style. The main difference is the 
existence of the Compromising style in the model proposed by Rahim (1983) which does not 
relate to a specific theme. In theory, the Compromising style is an intermediate state between 
the other styles that were identified. 
Previously, we proposed a model (Carneiro, Saraiva, Martinho, Marreiros, & Novais, 2018) that 
intends to allow agents to represent the decision-makers’ intentions. We consider the decision-
makers’ intentions to be what they: intend (a purpose), plan, desire and/or aspire. To reach the 
decision-maker’s intentions the agent should behave accordingly. We adopted the conflict styles 
proposed by Rahim and Magner (1995), and redefined them to be more adequate to the context 
of group decision-making. We called them styles of behavior and defined them as follows: 
• Dominating: A dominating individual believes that he owns the key to solve the 
problem. He plays a very active role during the decision-making process and tries to 
force his opinions on other participants; 
• Integrating: An integrating individual favors a collaborative style. He aims to achieve 
consensual decisions and greatly values his and others’ opinions. He prefers to manage 
assiduously the entire decision-making process; 
• Compromising: A compromising individual favors a collaborative style. He aims to 
achieve consensual decisions and values his and others’ opinions. He plays a 
moderately active role during the decision-making process; 
• Obliging: An obliging individual tends to give up on his opinions in favor of the group 
interests. He prefers to follow others’ opinions rather than sharing his owns; 
• Avoiding: An avoiding individual prefers to be freed from responsibility. 
Fundamentally, he prefers to not be involved in the decision-making process and 
devalues both the process and the opinions of other participants. 
Using a correlation between the work proposed by Rahim and Magner (1995) and the facets 
identified by Costa and MacCrae (1992) we proposed 4 dimensions suitable to the context of 
group decision-making: activity level, resistance to change, concern for self and concern for 
others. These dimensions represent: 
• Activity level: High activity levels reflect leadership and vigorousness. Low activity 
levels reflect leisurely and low need for thrills; 
• Resistance to change: High resistance to change reflect humble, eager to help and easily 
moved. Low resistance to change reflect aggressive, superior and skeptical; 
• Concern for self: High or low interests to satisfy his or her concerns; 
• Concern for others: High or low interests to satisfy the concerns of others. 
The information available in the literature only allows to define each style of behavior in these 
dimensions using classifications as low, mid and high. However, to computerize this model and 
to make agents represent the intentions as well/accurately as possible, we needed to transform 
this classifications into numerical values. Moreover, let us suppose that an existent model 
considers a Dominating behavior as having a low concern for others. How can we know if 
whenever a decision-maker selects the dominating behavior style to model his agent, he is 
expecting this “low concern for others”? To deal with these issues, we ran a survey to 
understand if it was possible to find homogeneous answers to define each style of behavior in 
each dimension (numerically). The objective was to verify if the behavior styles are perceived in 
the same way and if that can be expressed numerically. The study involved 64 participants, 39 
men and 25 women, aged between 19 and 68 years old (M=33,56; SD=10,84) all of which 
either had higher education degrees or were undergraduate students (10%). In respect to their 
fields of expertise, respondents were professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds, ranging 
from technology to social sciences. Basically, we asked them to classify the five proposed 
behavior styles in four dimensions: Concern for self; Concern for others; Resistance to change; 
and Activity level in a questionnaire ranging from 0-10 (by means of a visual analogic scale). 
All respondents were asked to fill out the questionnaire in the researcher’s presence to ensure 
engagement in the task and/or to provide assistance in the clarification of concepts or modes of 
signaling the answers. We used the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient to study the agreement 
level. For all dimensions results were above ,900, more precisely between ,915 and ,941, with 
highly significant results (p<,001). 
The values obtained in this study helped us to define the actuation levels for each style of 
behavior in each dimension as can be consulted in Table 1 (the values were normalized to the 
[0; 1] range). This behavior style model plays an important role in the work proposed in this 
paper. 
Table 1. Behavior style measures for each dimension. 
Style of behavior Activity Level Resistance to Change Concern for self Concern for others 
Dominating 0,94 0,92 0,95 0,17 
Integrating 0,90 0,54 0,78 0,85 
Compromising 0,58 0,42 0,55 0,62 
Obliging 0,23 0,12 0,20 0,87 
Avoiding 0,05 0,10 0,11 0,09 
 
An interest finding of this work was that none of the proposed styles of behavior is always more 
advantageous/beneficial over others regardless of context. This is an incentive for decision-
makers to choose the style of behavior that better fits to their intentions. 
2.5. Satisfaction models 
The literature is very poor in terms of satisfaction analysis as an indicator of the perceived 
decision’s quality. The results related to the evaluation of the satisfaction of the decision-makers 
with the decision made (in group), with the perception of the quality of the decision or with the 
quality of the decision obtained with the use of a GDSS are practically nonexistent. There are 
works that study the satisfaction with the use of a GDSS (or of a software in general) and the 
satisfaction of the decision-maker in the decision process using surveys. 
Briggs et al. (2003) presented a theory of meeting satisfaction, which explains the causes of 
conflicting research results on meeting satisfaction, as these results have never been fully 
explained in the group support systems literature. Therefore, their theory tries to contribute to a 
possible development of systems and methodologies that increase group efficiency and group 
effectiveness, without decreasing meeting satisfaction. The authors proposed and tested the 
Satisfaction Attainment Theory (SAT) – a causal model of meeting satisfaction. Taking into 
account the SAT assumptions, satisfaction, i.e., the affective arousal with a positive valance a 
participant felt after a meeting, would be a function of the perception that, balancing conflicting 
and mutually exclusive goals, the value of one’s goals increased, or the likelihood of their 
success increased because of the meeting. Meetings that produce positive Perceived Net Goal 
Attainment (PNGA) should also produce high levels of meeting satisfaction, and meetings that 
produce negative PNGA should also produce low levels of meeting satisfaction. However, other 
researchers may choose to define meeting satisfaction according to other factors, such as the 
degree to which a meeting has fulfilled certain requirements. The difficulty to provide a clear 
definition of meeting satisfaction reduces the degree to which research on meeting satisfaction 
can be generalized. 
In their work, Paul et al. (2004) explore how the performance of a GDSS affects the different 
satisfaction dimensions. They focus on three indicators of group performance, namely: the 
decision time, the efficiency in decision-making and the number of iterations in the group 
decision-making process. For each one of these indicators hypotheses that affect satisfaction 
were created. Example: “H1a – In a GDSS-supported group decision, the higher the decision 
time, the lower is the satisfaction of a group with the system used by its members.” This model 
is based on hypotheses and is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Paul et al. (2004) research model based on hypotheses. 
Some of the conclusions obtained from this work demonstrated that the performance of GDSS 
influences the group members’ satisfaction. When decision time increases, the system appears 
to be unproductive and the group members’ satisfaction with the system decreases. However, 
when GDSS meetings end quickly, members may perceive that they are rushed through the 
process and different alternatives of the decision situation are not adequately evaluated. This is 
evidenced in the positive relationship between decision time and the members’ satisfaction with 
the process. The authors found a positive relationship between the thoroughness of decision-
making and the group members’ satisfaction with the decision outcome. 
Tian et al. (2008) conducted a study on how to measure satisfaction based on the emotional 
space. The satisfaction measured sought to understand the users’ acceptance of a product by 
testing its usability. In order to analyze the emotional space, they used the PAD (Pleasure, 
Arousal and Dominance) model proposed by Mehrabian (1995). To find out his initial 
emotional state the user must answer to the Big Five Inventory questionnaire, and with the 
obtained personality he is given a standard emotional state. The emotions generated during the 
test are detected by observing the user’s behavior. His emotions decay through the process, 
getting closer to the initial state, as can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Changes of single dimension in PAD model (adapted from Tian et al. (2008)). 
After performing the test and building the emotional map, the emotional changes are registered 
and their sum is calculated. With emotional values, interesting conclusions are attained. The 
authors claim that “with a good pleasure emotional state, users can have a smooth thinking and 
judgment to choose the most effective method to finish the task, so the pleasure state of the 
users can reflect the affinity and usability of the product in the testing. The arousal degree has a 
positive effect on usability, but the high level of arousal means that users are in a highly 
concentrated spirit and get tired easily; on the other hand, also means that users may be thinking 
about a way to solve the problems. So, a lower level of positive arousal degree reflects the 
usability of the software operations. The improvement of the user domination means that users 
are in an intense state, and that has a negative effect on usability. High usability products should 
be consistent with the users’ traditional habits, without the need to consider the controllable 
process and solutions of the product. Therefore, the domination degree indirectly reflects the 
extent of the ease of using the product.” 
Husain (2012) presented a paper where he included a satisfaction tool to help solve problems in 
GDSS. The tool is based on linear goal programming (GP) in order to assist GDSS participants 
in performing group decision-making for problems that have multiple and conflicting 
alternatives. His objective is to achieve a higher satisfaction for the group using this technique. 
Some theoretical ideas in this paper are very similar to the ideas described in this paper: (1) the 
consideration of satisfaction in group decision-making process, (2) the use of satisfaction to 
achieve better results and (3) the consideration of the classification of the alternatives by the 
decision-makers to find the optimal solution. The author claims that with this approach it is 
possible to improve the participants’ satisfaction by reducing the deviation by 29%. However, 
this work does not include all the necessary variables to measure satisfaction, as is possible to 
verify in the literature (for instance, decision-makers’ expectations and the consideration of 
decision process). In addition, the decision-making process faces some limitations when using 
the GP strategy, such as: reconfiguration of the problem, impossibility of the decision-maker to 
add new information during the process, and some limitations related to human-interaction and 
psychological issues. 
3. Proposed Decision Satisfaction Model 
The decision satisfaction model presented in this paper follows the assumptions and premises 
defined in Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015). To evaluate the decision-maker’s satisfaction four 
main points are considered: meeting’s outcomes, decision-maker’s expectations, decision-
maker’s intentions and decision-maker’s emotional cost. Our proposal deals with these points 
making use of the typical data configured by the decision-makers in a Web-based GDSS (to 
support disperse meetings (Bjørn, Esbensen, Jensen, & Matthiesen, 2014)). 
3.1. Outcomes 
The alternative chosen by the group has an impact in the decision-maker’s satisfaction. This is 
an inescapable fact, since achieving the outcomes is the reason why decision-making process 
happens. The satisfaction or the perception of the decision quality is related to the outcomes 
(Carneiro, Marreiros, et al., 2015). However, to understand the impact of the outcomes in the 
decision-makers, it is necessary to see the big picture. As we have seen in the Section 2 “a 
decision is perceived as good when its expected value or utility of outcomes is judged to be 
more beneficial than the alternatives” (Higgins, 2000). Thus, whereas the preferred alternative is 
the best in the decision-maker’s perspective, the distance between the preferred alternative and 
the chosen one means a loss of the decision-maker’s satisfaction. The loss of satisfaction 
comprises the difference in the assessment made by the decision-maker for each of the 
alternatives, as well as the one by the participant who did not achieve the final decision. In this 
work, we consider the participant’s assessment of each alternative varying in a [0; 1] range, 
where 0 means “I do not like at all” and 1 means “I like very much” (see our proposal of a 
practical implementation based on this in Carneiro, Martinho, Marreiros, and Novais (2015)). 
To understand the satisfaction considering alternatives comparison, we suggest the following 
formulas: 
 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝐹 − 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑃 (1) 
 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 2𝐴𝑙𝑡𝐹 − 1 (2) 
 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = (1 − |𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛|) ∗ 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3) 
Where: 
• 𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 is the loss of decision-maker’s satisfaction based in the difference between the 
assessments made for the alternative chosen by the group (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝐹) and for his preferred 
alternative (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑃). The loss is zero when the chosen alternative is the same as his 
preferred alternative; 
• 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝐹 is the assessment made by the participant for the final alternative, alternative 
chosen by the group; 
• 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑃 is the assessment made by the participant for his preferred alternative; 
• 𝐴𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the conversion of the assessment made by the participant into our scale 
of dissatisfaction/satisfaction; 
• 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 is the participant’s satisfaction concerning the outcomes. Intends to evaluate 
the satisfaction based in the assessment made by the participant to the alternatives, 
including the loss of satisfaction in the case where his preferred alternative is not chosen 
by the group. 
We assume the 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 is the purely analytical evaluation of the decision-maker’s 
satisfaction. All other remaining points (presented below) have impact in 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠. The other 
points will depend on the context. 
3.2. Expectations 
In order to study the impact of expectations in decision-maker’s satisfaction (and considering 
the knowledge expressed in previous work (Carneiro, Marreiros, et al., 2015)) we assume the 
following rules. 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡i𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑠 == 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑠 == 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣e 𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 
In this work, we consider the Web-based Group Decision Support System as the only existent 
mechanism for the decision-makers to communicate. Thus, we assume that decision-makers can 
create expectations (consciously or unconsciously) regarding the chances in attaining their 
objectives (meeting’s outcomes) and the decision process (the set of events that may or may not 
happen during the period of time in which the decision process occurs). In this Subsection only 
the former is considered, the latter will be included in the Subsection 3.4. 
In a real scenario, decision-makers are creating expectations all the time: “Is he going to accept 
my request?”; “Will he help me support my idea?”, etc. However, when automated negotiation 
techniques are used, the decision-makers only create expectations about issues from what they 
can expect something from and which they can interact with. We consider that expectations can 
influence satisfaction in three different ways: 
• Positive impact: When the results exceed the expectations; 
• Negative impact: When the expectations are not achieved; 
• Without impact: When the expectations are achieved. 
We defined that decision-maker’s expectation is represented by a numerical value within the 
range [0; 1]. To evaluate expectation in this context, approaches as the ones proposed in 
Carneiro, Martinho, et al. (2015) can be used. The calculus of satisfaction including 
expectations is divided in 2 different conditions. Firstly, we address the situation where 
expectations are matched. This means, the expectations have a positive impact in satisfaction. 
Secondly, we address the situation where expectations are not matched, i.e., the expectations 
have a negative impact in satisfaction. 
Positive Impact. This type of impact occurs when the chosen alternative is the one 
preferred/supported by the participant. In this case, the impact of the expectation will be positive 
or neutral (in case the expectation is 1). The following formula is used to calculate the positive 
impact: 
 𝑃𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = (1 − 𝐸) ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑆 (4) 
Where: 
• 𝐸 is the participant’s expectation regarding the possibility of his preferred/supported 
alternative being chosen by the group; 
• 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑆 is the assessment made by the participant regarding the supported alternative. 
For a better understanding of the proposed formula, let us consider the scenarios where the 
impact should have the maximum and minimum values (extreme cases): 
• The positive impact should be 1 (maximum impact) when the participant’s expectation 
regarding the preferred/supported alternative being chosen by the group is 0 and the 
value of alternative assessment is 1; 
• The positive impact should be 0 (no impact) when the participant’s expectation 
regarding the preferred/supported alternative being chosen by the group is 1. This 
means that the decision-maker is taking it for granted. The maximum expectation on a 
positive situation does not bring any increased satisfaction as a form as impact. 
We can include now the expectations in the satisfaction calculation. 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 can be 
recalculated using the following formula: 
 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 + (1 − |𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠|) ∗ 𝑃𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡  (5) 
The most important point of this formulation is the possibility to recalculate the 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 
satisfaction using the impact in a form of a variable. 
In our proposal, we first understand which impact the expectation has (according to the different 
situations) and use the correct impact next (calculated according to the context). The use of 
(1 − 𝐸) in our formula intends to reflect the difference between the maximum expectation 
(which would be 1) and the participant’s expectation. 
Negative Impact. This type of impact occurs when the chosen alternative is not the one 
preferred/supported by the participant. In this case the impact of the expectation will be negative 
or neutral (in case the expectation is 0). The following formula is used to calculate the negative 
impact: 
 𝑁𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑆 − 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝐹) ∗ 𝐸 (6) 
In the case of a negative impact, we propose a different formula because in this situation the 
impact represents an expectation that has not been met, symbolizing a loss. Moreover, in this 
situation, to truly understand the expectation impact, we need to analyze the relation between 
this loss and the difference between the assessments of his preferred alternative and the one 
chosen by the group. As we have done before, let us consider the scenarios where the impact 
should have the maximum and minimum values (extreme cases): 
• The negative impact should be 1 (total impact) when the participant’s expectation 
regarding the preferred/supported alternative being chosen by the group is 1, the 
assessment of the alternative chosen by the group is 0 and the assessment of his 
preferred/supported alternative is 1; 
• The negative impact should be 0 (no impact) when the expectation is 0. 
We can include now the expectations in the satisfaction calculation. 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 can be 
recalculated using the following formula: 
 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 = 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 + ((1 − |𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠|) ∗ (−1)) ∗ 𝑁𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡  (7) 
3.3. Intentions 
Previously (Carneiro et al., 2018), we proposed a model to define styles of behavior in agents to 
represent the decision-makers’ intentions. In this proposal, we consider those styles of behavior 
to formulate the satisfaction model. However, this proposal can be easily adapted to situations 
where aspects such as personality and conflict styles are used. In this satisfaction model, we aim 
to assess the decision-maker’s satisfaction, so we use behavior to understand the impact of the 
process in the decision-maker. The process impact will vary according to the decision-maker’s 
intentions. For instance, let us consider a situation where the participant defined his conflict 
style as “Dominating”. If he notices that the most of other decision-makers do not like his 
preferred alternative, we can associate to him emotions as: distress and fear. On the other hand, 
if the participant defined his conflict style as “Obliging”, he may not feel the same emotions (or 
at least with same intensity) because his main intention is not to achieve is preferred alternative 
but to please some other/s decision-maker/s. This is a simple example to demonstrate that the 
impact will vary according to how the decision-maker experiences the process. 
We consider a set of events that decision-makers experience using a GDSS and correlate them 
with styles of behavior (using the OCC model (Ortony et al., 1990)). Ortony et al. (1990) 
proposed a global structure of emotion types where they defined “valenced reaction to”: 
consequences of events, actions of agents and aspects of objects. For our purpose, we only use 
the consequences of events. Into the consequences of events they distinguish between the 
consequences for other and consequences for self, what means a remarkable correlation with the 
classification of conflict styles proposed by Rahim and Magner (1995) where they defined the 
conflict styles according to the concern for self and the concern for others. We use the concern 
for self and concern for others’ dimensions to calculate the appropriate events’ impact according 
to the decision-maker’s intentions. 
The considered set of events are expressed in the Table 2. (CO is consequences for other and CS 
is consequences for self). “Concern for self” type events refer to situations that the decision-maker 
identifies as “consequences for self”, on the other hand, “Concern for others” type events relate 
to situations that the decision-maker identifies as “consequences for others”. This means that if a 
decision-maker encounters, for example, event 4, this event (which presents “consequences for 
self”) will have a greater impact on decision-makers with a behavior style that has a higher 
“Concern for Self” value. In other words, when a decision-maker experiences a “Concern for 
Self” type event, the emotions associated with that event are weighted with the value that the 
decision-maker’s style of behavior has in concern for self dimension. The same is obviously 
applied to the “Concern for Others” type events. 
Table 2. Considered events and respective description. 
# Event CS CO Emotions 
1 Participant’s preferred alternative was chosen by the group  × Joy 
2 Participant’s preferred alternative was not chosen by the group  × Distress 
3 Participant changed his preference to another alternative  × Hope (+ rules) 
4 The majority prefers the participant’s preferred alternative  × Joy, Hope (+ 
rules) 
5 A few or none decision-maker prefers the participant’s preferred 
alternative 
 × Distress, Fear 
(+ rules) 
6 The preferred alternative of the decision-maker/s that the 
participant considers credible/important was chosen by the group 
×  Happy-for 
7 The preferred alternative of the decision-maker/s that the 
participant considers credible/important was not chosen by the 
group 
×  Pity 
8 The majority prefers the participant’s preferred criterion  × Joy, Hope (+ 
rules) 
9 A few or none decision-maker prefers the participant’s preferred 
criterion 
 × Distress, Fear 
(+ rules) 
 
According to Ortony et al. (1990) special rules must be applied when the decision-maker 
experiences hope and fear: 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡i𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡i𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡i𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡i𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 
3.4. Emotional changes and mood variation 
Due to the brilliant work proposed by Gebhard (2005) where he correlates the PAD and the 
OCC model, many works appeared using the triggered emotions in order to update the mood 
state (including ourselves). For this model, we propose a correlation between the events defined 
in Subsection 3.3 with a set of triggered emotions for each of the situations. We used the work 
proposed in Ortony et al. (1990) to define a set of emotions for each of events and analyze the 
emotions triggered during the process to understand the emotional cost. 
In Table 2, we presented the set of considered events and the emotions associated to each event. 
As we can see, all the events are in some way related to the alternatives and criteria. These 
events describe the scenarios the decision-makers face every time they interact with the system 
(GDSS). However, it is also important to define the impact of each event. The impact of 
“Participant’s preferred alternative was not chosen by the group”, should be different if 
previously the participant faces an event of “A few or none decision-maker prefers the 
participant’s preferred alternative” or an event of “The majority prefers the participant’s 
preferred alternative”. That’s why it is crucial to include in our math the expectations created by 
the decision-maker throughout the process (already introduced in Subsection 3.2.) to better 
understand the event impact. 
Thus, we consider the process expectations: 
 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝑁𝑝/𝑁𝑡 (8) 
Where: 
• 𝑁𝑝 is the number of decision-makers supporting the participant’s preferred alternative 
or some other decision-maker/s that the participant considers credible/important; 
• 𝑁𝑡 is the total number of decision-makers. 
The 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 calculated in each event will have impact in the emotions calculated in the 
next interaction because every time a decision-maker faces a new situation, he will be affected 
by the new information plus the expectations that he created based in previous information. 
Next, we will describe how to process the emotions created in each situation: 
Let 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑆 be a set of emotions of one situation: 
 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑆 = {(𝑃1, 𝐴1, 𝐷1), … , (𝑃𝑛, 𝐴𝑛, 𝐷𝑛)} (9) 
Where: 
• 𝑛 is the number of created emotions; 
• 𝑃𝑖, 𝐴𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 are the values of Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance for emotion 𝑖 (based in 
[27]). 
Let 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇 be the sum of emotions in 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑆: 
 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇 = ∑ (𝑃𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  (10) 
Where: 
• 𝑛 is the number of created emotions; 
• 𝑃𝑖 , 𝐴𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑆. 
Let 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇  be the intensity of 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇 considering the value of the style of behavior being used 




∗ 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑚 (11) 
Let 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇
 be the 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇  considering 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  (12) 
Let 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 be the sum of intensities of all positive emotions (joy, hope, happy-for, 
satisfaction and relief) created in each situation along the process: 
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = ∑ (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=1 , 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑆 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  (13) 
Let 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 be the sum of intensities of all negative emotions (distress, fear, pity, 
disappointment and fears-confirmed) created in each situation along the process: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = ∑ (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑇𝑖
)𝑛𝑖=1 , 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑆 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  (14) 
After calculating 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, we compare the two intensities to understand 
the emotional cost. According to that, we propose the following simple rules: 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 == 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 > 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
𝐼𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 < 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
Now, we normalize the 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, such that 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 1: 
 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) (15) 
 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) (16) 
The difference of intensities will then be considered as a gain or a loss (or neutral in case of no 
emotional cost). Let us assume this value as 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  (17) 
Finally, with the objective of considering the emotional impact according to the importance of 
the process for the decision-maker, we defined that: 
𝐼𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 == 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 == 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 
𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑃 
𝐸𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ (𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑃 − 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝐹) 
3.5. Final satisfaction calculation 
Considering the value of participant’s satisfaction concerning the alternative chosen by the 
group and the value of his mood (both contemplating the expectations), now we are going to 
join them to do our final calculation of satisfaction: 
 𝑆𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠 + (1 − |𝐷𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠|) ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (18) 
The end result of satisfaction will belong to the interval [-1; 1]. 
The scale of satisfaction presented in Table 3, developed and inspired from the work of Babin 
and Griffin (1998), reflects the satisfaction with the final result obtained by the model here 
introduced. 
Table 3. Scale of satisfaction. 
Designation Interval 
Extremely Satisfied [0,75; 1] 
Much Satisfaction [0,5; 0,75[ 
Satisfaction [0,25; 0,5[ 
Some Satisfaction [0; 0,25[ 
Some Dissatisfaction [-0,25; 0[ 
Dissatisfied [-0,5; -0,25[ 
Very Dissatisfied [-0,75; -0,5[ 
Extremely Dissatisfied [-1; -0,75[ 
 
4. Study 1 
The first hypothesis we planned to study (h1) was to understand how the proposed satisfaction 
model can correctly (mathematically) express the assumptions and premises defined in 
Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015). For this, several tests were carried out, which consisted in 
verifying if the satisfaction result calculated by the proposed satisfaction model obeys the 
assumptions and premises defined in Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015). To perform our 
simulations, we used a prototype (previously developed) that uses a negotiation architecture 
based on social networks (Carneiro, Martinho, Marreiros, & Novais, 2016) and implements the 
argumentation-based dialogue model proposed in Carneiro, Martinho, Marreiros, Jimenez, and 
Novais (2017). All the simulations carried out consisted of inserting a set of previously defined 
inputs in order to see if the obtained results varied according to what was expected. 
Considering that the proposed satisfaction model includes the aspects considered in the 
assumptions defined in Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015), the main objective was to understand 
if the proposed model validates the premises defined in Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015). In 
Carneiro, Marreiros, et al. (2015) 9 premises were defined “that need to be validated by a 
decision satisfaction analysis model to be complete”: 
• P1: “When expectations are exceeded the final satisfaction will be positively affected”; 
• P2: “When the expectation is maximum and the result is the expected, expectations do 
not influence satisfaction”; 
• P3: “Expectations have a greater impact on events that are considered most important”; 
• P4: “When the expectations are not reached, final satisfaction will be negatively 
affected”; 
• P5: “When there are no expectations and the final outcome is not as expected, 
expectations do not affect satisfaction”; 
• P6: “A positive emotional cost positively affects the final satisfaction”; 
• P7: “A negative emotional cost negatively affects the final satisfaction”; 
• P8: “A neutral emotional cost will not affect final satisfaction”; 
• P9: “The adopted strategy affects satisfaction”. 
The first experiment aimed to study premises P1 and P2. To that end, 231 simulations were 
carried out, which consisted in varying the participant’s expectations and evaluating the 
preference of his preferred alternative, in order to determine if his satisfaction (calculated by the 
proposed model) with the decision would vary according to what was defined in P1 and P2. The 
participant agent has always been the same throughout all simulations and is referred to in this 
paper as 𝐷𝑀𝑥 (𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑥). In order to study P1 and P2 it was also considered that the 
alternative selected by the group was always the preferred of 𝐷𝑀𝑥, since it was only intended to 
study the situations in which expectations were met or exceeded. As previously stated, the 
expectation in relation to the “Probability of the participant’s preferred alternative to be chosen” 
varies in the [0; 1] range. The final satisfaction varies in the range [-1; 1] and the preferences of 
alternatives vary in the range of [0; 1]. Figure 5 presents the results obtained in this experiment. 
At the top of Figure 5 are presented the evaluations considered regarding the preferred 
alternative of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 (0; 0,1; 0,2; 0,3; 0,4; 0,5; 0,6; 0,7; 0,8; 0,9; 1,0). For each of these 
preferences, 21 simulations were performed, where expectations were varied (Figure 5 – x-axis) 
of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 (0,00; 0,05; 0,10; 0,15; 0,20; 0,25; 0,30; 0,35; 0,40; 0,45; 0,50; 0,55; 0,60; 0,65; 0,70; 
0,75; 0,80; 0,85; 0,90; 0,95; 1,00). In Figure 5, it is presented the final satisfaction of the 𝐷𝑀𝑥 
calculated for each scenario. As is clear for each of the 11 alternative preference evaluations, the 
final satisfaction is higher in scenarios where the expectation was lower. This only did not 
happen in two situations: when the evaluation of the alternative is maximum (1) and when the 
evaluation of the alternative is minimal (0). In the scenario where the evaluation is maximum, 
the final satisfaction never changes because it is already maximum, so expectations end up not 
having influence since we are dealing with a finite scale. In the scenario where the evaluation is 
minimal, expectations also do not influence the satisfaction since the participant does not have 
any type of preference for the alternative in question. 
 
Figure 5. Expectations’ positive impact on final satisfaction. 
This way, we may consider that the proposed model validates P1. In relation to P2, it is also 
verified that the proposed model validates this premise. As can be seen in formula 4 of the 
proposed model, when we are faced with a scenario in which the preferred of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 is the one 
chosen by the group (and expectations can have a positive impact on the satisfaction 
calculation), the fact that the expectation is 1 results (according to formula 4) on an impact of 0. 
This means that P2 is validated because the fact that the expectation is 1 has no influence on the 
satisfaction calculation. 
The second experiment aimed to study P3. To study P3 we used the same simulations (231) that 
were performed in the first experiment, but in this case the value we were interested in studying 
was the calculation of the impact of the expectation rather than the calculation of the final 
satisfaction. Figure 6 presents the results obtained in this experiment. 
At the top of Figure 6 are presented the evaluations considered regarding the preferred 
alternative of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 (0; 0,1; 0,2; 0,3; 0,4; 0,5; 0,6; 0,7; 0,8; 0,9; 1,0). For each of these 
preferences, 21 simulations were performed, where expectations were varied (Figure 6 – x-axis) 
of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 (0,00; 0,05; 0,10; 0,15; 0,20; 0,25; 0,30; 0,35; 0,40; 0,45; 0,50; 0,55; 0,60; 0,65; 0,70; 
0,75; 0,80; 0,85; 0,90; 0,95; 1,00). In Figure 6 of the y-axis, the expectation impact calculated 
for each scenario is presented. As is clear for each of the 11 alternative preference evaluations, 
the expectation impact is greatest in scenarios where the preferred alternative has a higher 
rating. This is true for all cases where the expectation is the same. In this way, it was possible to 
clearly perceive that the proposed model validates P3. 
The third experiment aimed to study P4 and P5. To do this, 168 simulations were carried out, 
which consisted in varying the participant’s expectations and evaluating the preference of his 
preferred alternative, in order to determine if his satisfaction (calculated by the proposed model) 
with the decision varied according to what was defined in P4 and P5. To study P4 and P5 it was 
also considered that the alternative selected by the group was never the preferred alternative of 
𝐷𝑀𝑥, since it was only intended to study situations in which expectations were not matched or 
did not affect satisfaction. To do so, it was considered that the alternative chosen by the group 
was evaluated by 𝐷𝑀𝑥 in 0.2 (making it always the comparison value/value to be compared). 
Figure 7 shows the results obtained in this experiment. 
 
Figure 6. Expectations’ impact according to the level of preference. 
 
Figure 7. Expectations’ negative impact on final satisfaction. 
In the upper part of Figure 9 are presented the evaluations considered in regard to the preferred 
alternative of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 (0,3; 0,4; 0,5; 0,6; 0,7; 0,8; 0,9; 1,0). In this case the evaluation of the 
preferred alternative begins at 0,3 since it must have at least a value higher than that used to 
evaluate the preference of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 relative to the alternative chosen by the group (0,2). For each of 
these preferences, 21 simulations were performed, where the expectations were varied do 𝐷𝑀𝑥 
(0,00; 0,05; 0,10; 0,15; 0,20; 0,25; 0,30; 0,35; 0,40; 0,45; 0,50; 0,55; 0,60; 0,65; 0,70; 0,75; 
0,80; 0,85; 0,90; 0,95; 1,00). In Figure 7, the final satisfaction of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 is calculated for each 
scenario. As is clear for each of the 11 alternative preference evaluations, the final satisfaction is 
lower in scenarios where the expectation was higher. This way, we can consider that the 
proposed model validates P4 because it is verified that in scenarios in which the expectations 
are not reached the final satisfaction is negatively affected. In addition, we found that the higher 
the expectations, the greater the negative impact. Regarding P5, it is also verified that the 
proposed model validates this premise. As is shown in formula 6 of the proposed model, when 
we are faced with a scenario in which the preferred alternative of 𝐷𝑀𝑥 is not the one chosen by 
the group (and expectations may have a negative impact on the satisfaction calculation), the fact 
that the expectation is 0, results (according to formula 6) on an impact of 0. This means that P5 
is validated because the fact that the expectation is 0 has no influence on the satisfaction 
calculation. 
In order to study P6, P7, P8 and P9, no simulations were performed because the formulation of 
the proposed model itself allows us to validate these premises. As we have seen in formula 18 
of the model proposed in this paper, the Cost (emotional) is considered and has an impact on the 
final calculation of satisfaction. As such, in case Cost is positive, it will have a positive impact 
on the satisfaction calculation, which allows us to validate P6, in case Cost is negative it will 
have a negative impact on the satisfaction calculation, which allows us to validate P7. In the 
case of Cost being 0, either because no emotions were generated during the process, or because 
(incredibly) the intensity of positive emotions and the intensity of negative emotions cancel 
each other out, there will be no impact on the calculation of satisfaction, which allows you to 
validate P8. 
Finally, as shown before, this model allows decision-makers to select one of several styles of 
behavior to be represented with. This way, decision-makers can define a strategy that best 
represents their intentions, which may generate different emotions and different intensities 
(since different events are considered). As follows, it is obvious that with different emotions and 
different intensities, the adopted strategy affects the satisfaction in different ways, which in turn 
allows us to validate P9. 
5. Study 2 
In this Section we intended to determine how our model would be able to predict the 
participants satisfaction. For this, we developed a prototype of a Web-based GDSS that allows 
participants to express their preferences regarding four possible alternatives. Also, they were 
asked to express their expectations towards having the group decide in accordance to their 
preferences, in various steps of the decision-making process, being allowed to (re)set their 
preferences between different rounds and also to (re)set the style of behavior to be represented 
with. In order to achieve this, first, as previously put forward in (h2) we needed to empirically 
validate the system’s ability to accurately predict the user’s satisfaction, comparing the 
predicted and the reported satisfaction. Besides evaluating the ability to match the participants 
expectations, we intended to achieve some more in-depth insight upon their own perception of 
satisfaction, i.e., to see if the system may go beyond their ability to do so. 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants 
In this study participants were 43 adults, 27 men and 16 women, aged between 21 and 64 years 
old (M=33,4; SD=11,47%) most of which either had higher education degrees or were 
undergraduate students, whereas 9,3% didn’t attend higher education. In respect to their fields 
of expertise, respondents were professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds, ranging from 
technology to social sciences. In Figure 8 we present their distribution. 
 
Figure 8. Distribution of participants according to area of expertise. 
5.1.2. Procedure 
In this study, (real) participants were asked to engage in a fictional scenario where they were 
supposed to imagine that they had been selected to take part in the preparation of a mission to 
Mars, and where a group decision was to be made regarding the most well-equipped type of 
items they were to carry with themselves, among four alternatives, each emphasizing one area 
of their needs: Leisure, Food, Hygiene and Comfort. 
For a better understanding, actual instructions were as follows: 
“Welcome, adventurer! Congratulations! You have been selected as one of the few that 
will take part in the mission to Mars scheduled for 2021.You will integrate a team of 12 
passengers with whom you will have opportunity to participate in the preparation of the 
trip. (…) Each passenger will carry 4 suitcases and each suitcase will be of a different 
type (Leisure, Food, Hygiene and Comfort). Each type of suitcase exists in 2 formats: 
standard and plus. Passengers can only carry one of the suitcases in the plus format, 
which, once chosen, will be the same for everyone. It is intended that together with the 
remaining passengers you choose the type of upgraded suitcase to be carried as the 
plus version. This application allows you to express your preferences regarding each 
type of suitcase and to follow how the expression of preferences by the rest of the group 
unfolds. The decision process consists of several rounds, among which you can reset 
your preferences. If no consensus is reached within a maximum of 5 rounds, the 
suitcase with the highest number of supporters will be the selected one.” 
The Figure 9, regarding our problem data, presents the items that constitute the standard and the 
plus version of the suitcases. 
 
Figure 9. Composition of the different suitcases to choose from. 
They were then asked to express how they would value their preference towards each suitcase 
by means of a slide bar ranging from “Not Preferred at all” to “Totally Preferred”. Since the 
chosen template allows us to set the values with all bars being visible together, the task of 
valuing the alternative automatically entails the purpose of comparison. Figure 10 depicts the 
instructions and the slide bars to value each alternative, as they were shown to the participant. 
 
Figure 10. Slide bars used by the participant to define his/her preferences. 
Additionally, participants were asked to define the style of behavior with which they would like 
to be represented in their simulated interaction and also to state their perceived level of expertise 
regarding the task in hand (Figure 11). This choice of level of expertise was introduce merely 
for dramatic effect and to promote a greater involvement in the task, not being subject to any 
computation. 
 
Figure 11. Configuration of the participant’s style of behavior and expertise level. 
After configuring all the problem and personal settings participants proceeded to the simulated 
rounds and got feedback after each one regarding how many supporters each alternative was 
gathering at that point (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12. Presentation of supporters for each alternative. 
Upon seeing this, they were asked to (re)set their expectations in light of new information and 
were able to redefine their preference and/or behavior style to try to facilitate the pursuit of their 
goal, either new or the one initially stated. In the end of the five rounds, participants were asked 
to express their satisfaction with the final decision by means of a slide bar ranging from 
“Extremely Dissatisfied” to “Extremely Satisfied” and only in a second phase (so as not to 
influence the evaluation of the satisfaction made by the participants) they were asked if they 
agreed with the satisfaction predicted by the model. 
5.2. Results 
To interpret the results, it was essential to include a certain amount of sensitivity in order not to 
compromise the scientific validity of the study. Obviously, the prime objective was to assess the 
ability of the model to predict decision-makers’ satisfaction with the decision. However, there 
were a number of factors that had to be considered in such a way that the evaluation of the 
model’s ability to predict satisfaction was properly elaborated. Since at the end of each decision 
process each participant was questioned whether he/she agreed with the satisfaction provided by 
the model, i.e., if the designation presented (Table 3) by the system corresponded to its final 
satisfaction, in a simplistic way this percentage of agreement could be considered as the 
probability of the model to correctly measure satisfaction. Out of 43 participants, 38 (88,4%) 
agreed with system’s prediction regarding the scale before mentioned in Table 3 (not excluding 
any case, even if it later is possible it is to be addressed as possible error or outlier). 
As mentioned earlier (Subsection 5.1), at the end of the decision process participants were asked 
to express their satisfaction with the final decision by means of a slide bar ranging from 
“Extremely Dissatisfied” to “Extremely Satisfied” and only in a second phase (so as not to 
influence the evaluation of the satisfaction made by the participants) they were asked if they 
agreed with the satisfaction predicted by the model. In Figure 13 the satisfaction of all 
participants is presented, with reported and predicted values. For each participant is presented 
the satisfaction expressed by the participant using the slibe bar (Reported Satisfaction) and the 
satisfaction predicted by the model (Predicted Satisfaction). 
 
Figure 13. Participants’ satisfaction – reported and predicted values. 
In a first moment, we tried to understand why 5 of the 43 participants (11,6%) did not consider 
the prediction of satisfaction presented by the model to be correct. For this, each case was 
analyzed individually. 
Participant 20 clearly adopted a strategic approach, artificially polarizing his/her positions 
(Table 4) trying “to beat the system”, forcing it in the direction of his/her preferred alternative 
and pretending to dislike an alternative that he/she actually did like. However, when asked to 
evaluate his satisfaction with the final decision, he/she evaluated it as “Some Satisfaction”, 
which clearly means that the evaluation of 0 (in the interval [0; 1]) with which he/she evaluated 
the alternative chosen by group clearly did not represent his/her real preference for this 
alternative. This is undoubtedly one of the greatest future challenges of this type of model, to be 
able to see if the reappraisal of a particular alternative occurs due to a real change of opinion 
(due to arguments that have been changed, or other factors) or if it only happens due to a 
decision maker’s intent to manipulate the system. 
Table 4. The set of participants who did not consider the satisfaction predicted by the model to be correct (11.6%). 
Participant Reported 
Satisfaction [-1; 1] 
Predicted 
Satisfaction [-1; 1] 
Chosen 
Alternative [0; 1] 
Preferred 
Alternative [0; 1] 
20 0,20 -1 0 1 
26 1 -0,539 0,46 0,75 
31 1 -1 0 1 
40 -1 -1 0 1 
42 -0,8 0.260 0,75 0,9 
 
Participant 40 (Table 4) is clearly an example of someone who made a mistake when he/she 
rated the satisfaction presented by the model as incorrect. So, let’s see, he/she evaluated the 
alternative chosen by the group as “Not Preferred at all” (numerically evaluated it as 0 in the 
interval [0; 1], evaluated its preferred alternative as “Totally Preferred” (numerically evaluated 
it as 1 in the interval [0; 1] ) when asked to rate his/her satisfaction with the final decision rated 
his/her as “Extremely Dissatisfied” (numerically rated his/her satisfaction as -1 in the range [-1; 
1]) which makes sense considering that he/she rated her preferred alternative with a “maximum 
preference” and evaluated the alternative chosen by the group with “a minimum preference” and 
finally when asked if it agreed with the “Extremely Dissatisfied” satisfaction prediction, it 
replied that it was not. This way, the satisfaction predicted by the model was correct. 
Finally, of the 11,6% of the participants who did not agree with the evaluation predicted by the 
model, 3 of them (6,9% – participants 26, 31 and 42) presented a scenario that only allowed us 
to conclude that these fit into one of two possibilities : (1) the study was not internalized (by 
these participants) with a level of seriousness that would at least approximate a real scenario, 
which resulted in somewhat random or not very serious configurations; (2) the participants had 
difficulties in expressing/evaluating their own satisfaction, as we will see later on, which is also 
something that has happened in some participants who agreed with the prediction of satisfaction 
presented to them by the model. 
The study of each of the 5 participants who did not agree with the satisfaction predicted by the 
model showed that there are situations (even if for different reasons) in which the participants 
are not able to correctly express their satisfaction. What on the one hand is positive in the sense 
that it illustrates another benefit of the model presented in this paper, on the other hand, denoted 
the need to analyze almost every single case of the remaining 88,4% of participants who 
considered that the forecast of the satisfaction presented by the model was correct. Of these 
88,4%, only 45% reported a satisfaction value that was exactly in the same range (Table 3) of 
the satisfaction value predicted by the model, which is not worrisome (despite being a low 
percentage) since in this model are considered 8 intervals (designations) for the satisfaction. 
However, taking into account the knowledge previously extracted, we were able to analyze 
within 88,4% of the participants who agreed with the prediction of satisfaction presented to 
them, possible cases in which the participant’s satisfaction evaluation was not a demonstration 
of their preferences and what had happened in the process. Again, cases were detected in which 
the satisfaction indicated by the participant was not minimally demonstrative of their true 
satisfaction. With the advantage that it has now been possible to determine that in these cases, 
the difference between the indicated satisfaction (through the slide bar) and the expected 
satisfaction that was consequently considered correct by the participant was not due to strategic 
reasons. Table 5 presents the participants who indicated values of satisfaction that did not 
correspond minimally to the designation of satisfaction considered correct by the participant 
himself. 
Table 5. The set of participants who considered the satisfaction predicted by the model correct but indicated a 
satisfaction value that does not correspond to what was predicted. 
Participant Reported 
Satisfaction [-1; 1] 
Predicted 
Satisfaction [-1; 1] 
Chosen 
Alternative [0; 1] 
Preferred 
Alternative [0; 1] 
2 0 -0,919 0,3 0,9 
9 -0,4 1 1 1 
13 0 -0,898 0,4 1 
27 0,04 -0,979 0,17 0,88 
 
If, on the one hand, having questioned the participants about their agreement to the satisfaction 
provided by the system was one of the main indicators of the ability of the model to predict 
satisfaction (88,4% of agreement), on the other hand, comparing the satisfaction predicted by 
the model with the satisfaction reported by the decision-makers (in what are purely numerical 
evaluations) it was necessary to use other strategies. For this, the participants mentioned in 
Table 4 and Table 5 (21% of the total participants) were removed, since they have performed 
unconscious, illogical configurations or manipulation strategies that represent “noise” in the 
analysis that is intended to be done. Thus, 79% of the population (34 participants) initially 
surveyed is represented in Table 6 (all numerical values presented are in the range [-1; 1]). 
Table 6. All participants excluding the presented in Table 4 and Table 5. 
Participant Reported Satisfaction Outcomes Expectations Predicted Satisfaction 
1 0,48 0,26 0,43 0,79 
3 -0,8 -0,5 -0,66 -0,83 
4 -0,6 -0,5 -0,7 -0,85 
5 -1 -1 -1 -1 
6 -1 -1 -1 -1 
7 1 0,94 0,95 0,99 
8 1 1 1 1 
10 -1 -1 -1 -1 
11 -0,7 -0,76 -0,78 -0,91 
12 -0,78 -1 -1 -1 
14 -0,84 -0,97 -0,99 -0,99 
15 -0,5 -0,5 -0,56 -0,67 
16 1 0,8 0,81 0,98 
17 -1 -1 -1 -1 
18 0 0,22 0,22 0,10 
19 0,08 0,46 0,45 0,39 
21 -0,5 -0,12 -0,47 -0,56 
22 -0,38 -0,29 -0,39 -0,65 
23 -0,6 0,22 0,03 -0,09 
24 -0,18 -0,51 -0,62 -0,68 
25 -0,7 -0,5 -0,6 -0,8 
28 -0,32 -0,11 -0,14 -0,16 
29 -0,6 -0,95 -0,97 -0,99 
30 -0,76 -0,78 -0,81 -0,91 
32 -0,86 -0,76 -0,82 -0,90 
33 -0,72 -0,85 -0,89 -0,94 
34 -1 -0,99 -0,99 -0,99 
35 -1 -0,84 -0,88 -0,91 
36 -0,4 0,22 0,07 -0,19 
37 0,02 0,26 0,25 0,23 
38 0,28 0,381 0,35 0,23 
39 0,02 0,10 0,03 -0,04 
41 0 0,37 0,25 0,07 
43 -1 -1 -1 -1 
 
The “Outcomes” column presents the expected calculated satisfaction only considering the 
formulation introduced in Subsection 3.1, the “Expectations” column presents the calculation of 
the expected satisfaction already including the formulation presented in Subsection 3.2 and 
finally the “Predicted Satisfaction” column includes all the proposed formulation (inclusion of 
the intentions of the decision maker and the emotional cost in the final calculation of the 
satisfaction prediction). As we can see, for several participants it was fruitful to have the 
variables “expectations” and “emotional changes” being computed, since only after the 
inclusion of these factors expected satisfaction value reached the same interval (Table 3) of the 
reported satisfaction. Although it may seem that “expectations”, on its own, does not take the 
participant to the correct value, it is the approximation which it facilitates that makes it possible 
for the inclusion of the “emotional changes” layer to have an effect and lead to the correct 
evaluation. 
In order to study the difference between the satisfaction value reported by the decision-makers 
and the satisfaction value predicted by the proposed model, the values of the Mean Absolute 
Error, Normalized Mean Absolute Error and Root-Mean-Square Error were calculated. The 
calculated values are given in Table 7. 
Table 7. Values of Mean Absolute Error, Normalized Mean Absolute Error and Root-Mean-Square Error. 
Mean Absolute Error Normalized Mean Absolute Error Root-Mean-Square Error 
0,14353 0,14211 0,20031 
 
As shown in Table 7, the approximate value of Root-Mean-Square Error is approximately 0,20, 
which means that the model presented has a very good predictability. In addition, we have also 
been studying the results obtained regarding precision, accuracy, recall and F1 score. For this, it 
was necessary to make a confusion matrix. Since our satisfaction scale is presented in the 
interval [-1; 1] and contains 8 possible designations, each designation occupying a size of 0,25 
on the scale. Therefore, we considered that the predicted satisfaction value (PS) belongs to the 
real value class (satisfaction value reported by the decision maker – RS) if 𝑃𝑆 ≥ 𝑅𝑆 − 0,25 ∧
𝑃𝑆 ≤ 𝑅𝑆 + 0,25. Table 8 represents the confusion matrix including all participants (43). True 
Class represents the response given by the participant, i.e. if the satisfaction forecast presented 
to you was or was not correct and Predicted represents, as stated, whether the predicted 
satisfaction value falls within the range described above. 
Table 8. Confusion matrix. 
  True Class 
  Yes No 
Predicted 
Yes TP (28) FP (1) 
No FN (10) TN (4) 
 
Table 9 presents the accuracy, recall, accuracy and F1 Score values for the confusion matrix 
presented in Table 8. 
Table 9. Values of Precision, Recall, Accuracy and F1 Score. 
Precision Recall Accuracy F1 Score 
0,966 0,737 0,744 0,836 
 
In this context the value that becomes more important to analyze is that of precision since it 
represents the proportion of positive predictions performed by the satisfaction model proposed 
here. A precision of 0,966 is an excellent value, an accuracy of approximately 75% is also a 
fairly good value, although it does not fully illustrate the good results obtained by the model 
since that in this context only the number of “True Negatives” truly represents the number of 
situations in which the model predicts the satisfaction incorrectly. Since there were only 4 True 
Negatives, it is possible to say that the probability of the proposed model to predict the decision 
incorrectly is 9%. Only one participant was considered as False Positive, which in turn allows to 
conclude that the model was able to predict the satisfaction of the participants in 91% of the 
situations. 
6. Discussion 
When using agents to represent decision-makers, studying satisfaction inherently may lead us to 
focus on those (users) who are the most harmed when they don’t succeed. We need to take into 
account that there are emergent situations arising from a decision-making scenario, from which 
events are generated empirically. For instance, we perceive that a fear-generating event may 
arise in some situations when, despite having a lot of supporters behind the preferred 
alternative, it is not the most supported one. As we are not controlling for this, emotions that we 
calculate may have a greater impact than we anticipated, i.e., notwithstanding our conclusion 
that they indeed help approximate the model from the “true” satisfaction, the inevitable 
imperfection in the definition of events cause these “errors” to occur. Nevertheless, the model is 
capable of predicting with great accuracy. 
What possible could enrich our model would be a more mixed-type scenario, where, for 
instance the user’s favorite alternative has a lot of supporters from the start (without being the 
favorite), causing hope to be experienced, but that as the process unfolds, another alternative 
starts gathering support, becoming better placed to win. Instead of generating hope, fear would 
be generated, for seeing his/her objectives as less likely to be reached. Despite ascertaining the 
importance of integrating emotional variables into the process – in the sense that it helps to 
approximate to what the participant’s satisfaction actually is – we need to bear in mind that in 
our case we only used “concern for self” type-events, making it impossible for us to know how 
the model would respond to “concern for others” type-events. Would their inclusion indeed 
prove to be beneficial or only bring uninformative noise, ending up clouding the 
calculus/computation. 
What we may ponder at this point is that, in principle, it would also help predicting satisfaction 
with a higher degree of accuracy. Besides having confirmed the premises we put forward, it was 
also possible to understand that the emotional cost tends to vary in accordance to how important 
the decision is for each decision-maker, the degree of attachment of the decision-maker with 
his/her preferred alternative cause the impact of the emotional cost to vary, as well as the 
difference in the evaluation between the alternative that is chosen by the group and the one that 
was his/her favorite. 
We also verified that, since we work with expectations tied to a supported alternative, the 
evaluation may suffer a loss whenever the preferred is not the one that ends up being chosen by 
the group. It may even suffer a loss that sprouts from the contingent emotional cost, but may 
otherwise have gains on the expectation side, in case the alternative chosen by the group is the 
one that was the one supported by the decision-maker at that point in time. Another situation 
that may be worthy of note is when the systems’ use is perverted. As is easily understandable, 
when a user that evaluates an alternative with zero (“not preferred at all”) by merely strategic 
reasons, not feeling that complete aversion towards the alternative, is behaving in a way that is 
“against” the system, as if it were a game to be won. This person won’t be benefiting from a 
system of this kind according to its initial purpose and this highlights the need for a period of 
training so that decision-makers can make the most of the model. 
To the best of our knowledge, there still are not other approaches in literature that allow to 
predict a decision-maker’s satisfaction in respect to the decision taken as a whole, or a part of 
the decision-making process is yet supported by a GDSS or other kind of collaborative system. 
This way, it was necessary to resort to sound knowledge coming from other areas of study. Our 
main concern was to formulate this model based in knowledge upon which there would be the 
highest possible agreement, resulting in a less ambiguous formulation. What also in a certain 
way necessarily resulted in the use of a less recent literature. We consider that the study of 
satisfaction in this context will become a relevant topic and that this work opens a line of 
thought for models that may be a lot more sophisticated and with higher levels of precision. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this article, we proposed a whole new model which allows the automatic assessment of the 
participants’ satisfaction in a meeting supported by a Web-based Group Decision Support 
System. We believe that the proposed model allows the obtainment of a large amount of useful 
and valuable information. 
Satisfaction can be used as a metric to compare different Web-based GDSS or automatic 
negotiation mechanisms. In addition, satisfaction can either be used as a utility function in order 
to maximize the decision-makers’ satisfaction or can be used by agents to predict the decision-
maker’s satisfaction. To evaluate satisfaction, we considered the comparison and evaluation of 
alternatives, the expectations, emotions, mood and the process. The values obtained in the 
calculus of satisfaction respect the premises that were defined in a previous work. In addition, 
we ran a case study with real participants that allowed to understand that the proposed model is 
capable of predicting the users’ satisfaction with a very interesting degree of accuracy. 
As future work, we intend to study the satisfaction of participants that seem to adopt strategic 
approaches along the process, i.e., focusing on those who, from a certain point on, evaluate the 
alternatives not according to what they consider to be the intrinsic value of the alternative for 
solving a problem/task but instead, behave so as to manipulate the decision. Here we could also 
see that it may also be important to identify the emergent satisfaction in dealing with the 
situation these previously unintended ways. Also for future reference it will be important to 
enrich the emotional features, as well as the events, allowing us to clarify some aspects as well 
as reason about the timing of decisions in the process, both in terms of duration and outlook in 
terms of timespan. 
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